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our own.Brunner (1961) proposed that a monetary base measure should account for
changes in reserve requirement ratios. 1 Following Brunner's lead, both the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System calculate monetary base series that account for changes in
reserve requirement ratios. In earlier work (see, for example, Ras1ag and
Hein, 1990), researchers have demonstrated that the existing monetary base
series can be additive1y decomposed into high-powered money and an index
value, measured in dollars, that gauges the effects of changes in reserve
requirements. The index is constructed as differences in reserve requirement
ratio structure relative to some base period reserve requirement structure,
multiplied by the quantity of deposits against which reserves were required to
be held. Accordingly, the index is interpreted as changes in the amount of
reserves freed (absorbed) by lowering (raising) reserve requirement ratios
relative to the base period structure.
Some researchers have questioned the method in which changes in reserve
requirement ratios are constructed. Neumann (1983, p.595), for example,
asserts that because of the index calculation, the St. Louis adjusted monetary
base "is a biased indicator of Federal Reserve policies as its rate of change
reflects changes in the behavior of banks and the public." Frost (1977,
p.169) also criticized the Brunner approach, asserting that the reserve index
measures changes in deposit flows and changes in reserve requirement ratios.
Frost used a conventional, nonlinear model of the money supply process,
deriving an alternative monetary base measure. Changes in this monetary base
measure should "reflect the combined effect of Federal Reserve open market
operations and reserve requirement changes on the ratio of growth of the money
stock."
1The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, a measure is constructed
and provided, separating the effects of changes in reserve requirement ratios-
-denoted the reserve adjustment index--from changes in deposits. Recently,
several researchers (see Lougani and Rush (1991), Toma (1988), P10sser (1990),
and Has1ag and Hein (1992» have examined the effects of changes in reserve
requirement ratios. In constructing our index measure, we derive a measure of
changes in reserve requirement ratio changes. We employ Brunner's liberated
reserves notion, constraining changes in the reserve index measure to equal
zero during periods in which no changes in reserve requirement structures were
implemented. To this end, we provide a dollar measure of changes in reserve
requirement dating back to 1929. One specific aim in this paper is to
distinguish changes in reserve requirement ratios from deposit-flow movements.
Our focus, therefore, is on the index value itself: measuring the effect of
reserve requirement ratio changes, as opposed to the properties of a monetary
base measure.
Second, we undertake an empirical investigation of the importance of
this measurement issue. While the criticism of the existing procedure is well
known, the significance of the distortion has been left unexamined. We
provide results indicating that the reserve requirement ratio measure is
indeed statistically different from the conventional measure that comprises
both reserve requirement ratio effects and deposit-flow effects. Our main
finding in this section is that the distortion in the conventional reserve
index measure is not as trivial as some may believe. 2 We use measures of
reserve-requirement effect and deposit-flow effect in an analysis of each
one's marginal predictive content. The evidence suggests that one should
relax the implicit assumption in RAM which restricts the effects to be equal.
2In short, there is evidence supporting the notion that one can reject the null
hypothesis that the coefficient on the reserve requirement measure is equal to
the coefficient on the deposit-flow measure in several reduced-form equation.
As such, the evidence suggests that researchers would want to distinguish
between reserve-requirement effects and deposit-flow effects in empirical
analysis.
1. The Reserve Adjustment Index
The existing monetary base series provides researchers with a measure
that captures monetary policy implemented through open market operations and
discount window borrowings, which change the value of high-powered money, and
reserve requirement ratio changes, which change the value of the index. One
important concern is that index value responds to decisions under the purview
of households and depository institutions in addition to actual changes in
reserve requirement ratios. Critics claim that current index values
misestimate the effects of changes in reserve requirement ratios by including
these nonpolicy effects.
To illustrate this criticism, consider the conventional version of the
index as constructed by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, referred to as
the reserve adjustment magnitude (RAM), which is calculated as
(1)
where rb is the vector of reserve requirements that are set by the Federal
Reserve System during a preselected base period, r t is the vector of reserve
requirement ratios in place at time t, and D t is the vector of deposit types
3against which reserves are required to be held. Equation (1) indicates that
RAM captures changes in reserve requirements such that if reserve requirement
ratios are lowered, for example, RAM will increase.
An additional feature of equation (1) which is that RAM is defined as
the product of changes in reserve requirement ratios and deposits. For
example, if the current reserve requirement ratio structure is less than that
of the base period, an expansion (contraction) of deposits will estimate an
additional freeing (absorbing) of reserves, resulting in RAM increasing
(decreasing). In this case, simple uniform deposit growth will suggest a
freeing of reserves. Of course, such a freeing of reserves is not due to a
policy action, but rather occurs because of public actions as suggested by
Frost and Neumann. Deposit contraction would do just the opposite in this
setting; in effect, RAM would underestimate the full size of the reserve
requirement ratio change because the product falls as deposits contract.
Deposit growth or contraction, then, influences the measurement of monetary
policy actions relative to an arbitrary base period. Alternatively, if the
current reserve requirement ratio structure is greater than the base period
structure, then changes in deposits will affect RAM but now in the opposite
direction. Regardless, as long as the reserve requirement structure at any
point in time differs from the base period, RAM will change with deposit
shifts, even if the reserve requirement structure remains intact. Neumann
calls such effects "passivelt and argues that such effects mismeasure policy
actions insofar as RAM will change when no policy actions were taken.'
2. Constructing the Reserve Step Index
We offer an alternative measure that is not affected by such deposit
4flows. To create our reserve step index (RSI), we use data on weekly changes
in required reserves.' To begin, we follow the St. Louis practice in that RSI
is constructed using the average reserve requi.rement ratio structure over the
period 1976-80 as its base period.' To construct our RSI measure, we find the
monthly value of RAM that is closest to zero and select this as our benchmark.
This means setting the value of the RSI equal to zero for that month. In this
regard, we selected August 1978 as our base period.
The dates of changes in reserve requirement ratios were obtained from
the Annual Report of the Board of Governors for every year from 1929 to the
present. With the dates of the changes in reserve requirement ratios, the
difference between required reserves in the week(s) in which the change in
structure took place and the week prior to change is used as the value of
reserves freed (absorbed) by the policy action." (Our use of weekly data will
be important later in the empirical analysis.) This measure is added
(subtracted) to the previous level of RSI, resulting in a cumulated measure of
dollar changes in required reserves. We first move forward from August 1978,
looking for the first date on which changes in reserve requirement ratios were
altered after August 1978. On that date, we calculate the monthly change in
RSI according to equation (2):
RRt - 1 - RRt if reserve requirement changes
(2)
5
o otherwise.Similarly, from the August 1978 benchmark, we move backward, looking for dates
on which changes in the reserve requirement ratio structure were implemented.
In months with no change in reserve requirements, the step index was held
constant.
Equation (2) represents the dollar amount of reserves freed (absorbed)
by changes in reserve requirements in the particular week in which the policy
action was enacted. We then sum across all the changes in RSI that took place
within a month, adding this monthly value of the change in RSI to the previous
month's level. As such, we obtain a cumulative measure of changes in reserve
requirement ratios across time.
The relationship between changes in RSI and changes in RAM is
straightforward. First note that RRt - rtDt (where RR is required reserves).
Substituting this expression into equation (I), one can write
(3)
for periods in which changes in reserve requirement ratios occur (6 is the
difference operator). In periods in which no changes in reserve requirements
take place, r t - rt-l l such that
(4) 6RAMt
Together, equations (3) and (4) describe the movements in RAM, differentiating
between periods in which changes in reserve requirement ratios occur and
periods in which only changes in deposit levels occur. Equations (3) and (4)
share a common term, rb'~Dt. This terms represents the amount of required
6reserves if the base period reserve requirement structure were in place today.
The sole difference between the periods with and without reserve
requirement ratio changes is in the second term on the right-hand side. In
equation (4), we refer to r<'aD< as the deposit-flow effect because changes in
deposits change RAM even though r< - r<_l' In short, reserves are treated as
freed as deposits change over time. However, the second-term in equation (3)
captures the quantity of reserve freed in response to changes in reserve
requirement ratios, hence RSI.
In periods in which no changes to reserve requirements occur, aRSI - 0
by construction. Thus, aRAM< - fiRSI< - rb'aD< - rt'aD<, for periods in which
ar< - O. For periods in which reserve requirement changes occur, ~ -
aRSI< - r b ' aD<.
After constructing aRSI for each month, we construct a time series for
the level of RSI, adding the monthly changes derived from equation (2) to the
previous month's value of RSI. In doing so, we obtain a cumulative dollar
measure of changes in reserve requirements indexed to August 1978. Our aim is
to provide a measure that is as free of the deposit-flow effect as possible.
,Our approach focuses solely on the infrequent, permanent aspect of changes in
reserve requirements. By construction, changes in deposit levels during
period of stable reserve requirements result in no change in our RSI measure.
It should be noted that RSI represents an average, as opposed to a
marginal, tax concept. If one were to divide RSI by the quantity of deposits
against which reserves must be held, the term would represent the average
reserve requirement ratio. Barro and Sahasakul (1983) and Seater (1985)
develop average marginal tax rate series for the United States. For our
purposes, detailed data are necessary on the quantity of deposits held at
7banks by each reserve-requirement distinction. Such data, however, are not
available. Thus, our efforts yield a first approximation of changes in
average marginal reserve requirement ratios.
3. Comparing RSI and RAM over time
Figure 1 plots the original RAM series and the step index from January
1929 through June 1991. (The actual monthly series for RSI is included in the
appendix.) The RSI does not move in periods between changes in reserve
requirement structures. In the absence of the deposit-flow effect, the step
index is constructed as a sequence of infrequent, permanent shocks.
The two reserve index series are qualitatively similar, although some
important differences emerge. For example, the period between 1929 and 1936
represents a sizeable departure between the two measures. The RSI hovers
around -$4 billion, indicating that reserve requirements were higher during
this interval than those in place during the 1978 base period. In contrast,
RAM is near zero until about 1936 and only then declines. This episode
epitomizes,the deposit-flow effect. The difference between the two measures
results from the sharp reduction in deposits during the 1930s. Even though
the reserve requirement tax was relatively high, deposit levels were smaller.
The researcher using RAM would be treating the reduction in RAM as if the
quantity of reserves absorbed was small in terms of reserve requirement ratios
higher than the 1976-80 base period. From RAM, one would infer that reserve
requirement had very little effect as a means of restrictive monetary policy.
RSI, however, suggests a much more restrictive policy stance was in place in
the 1929-36 period relative to the August 1978 base period. In fact, RAM
8appears to understate the level of potency of reserve requirement ratio
changes from 1929 through about 1945.
Another large disappearance occurs when an abrupt increase in deposits
in 1973 drove RAM down sharply. RSI indicates, however, that very few
reserves were absorbed by monetary policy actions. The rapid deposit growth
in this period exaggerates the policies regarding reserve requirements. RSI
suggests that the level of reserve requirements in 1973 was not greatly
different from 1978 and only slightly higher in the aggregate. However, as
the public moved deposits into these reservab1e accounts in 1973, RAM
estimates the level of reserve requirements as being more restrictive relative
to the 1978 base period. Similarly, in the early 1980s deposit growth drove
RAM sharply higher, giving a somewhat inflated view of the impact that
monetary policy actions had in terms of freeing reserves. 7
4. A Time Series Analysis of the Differences between RSI and RAM
By displaying the levels of RAM series and the RSI, Figure 1 suggests
differences between the two measures. However, the figure does little to shed
light on how important such differences are. One way to shed further light on
this issue is to examine the long-run relationships between the RSI and RAM.
The long-run relationship is tested for using cointegration techniques.
If deposit-flow effects are short-run phenomenon that result in temporary
deviations between the two measures, then deviations between the two series
disappear in the long run. On the other hand, if deposit flows are
significant and not self reversing, there is likely to be little relationship
in the two series in the long-run.
In short, the question is whether the methodology has significant long-
9run impacts in terms of measured changes in reserve requirement ratios. This
examination is conducted using the cointegration procedures developed in Engle
and Granger (1987). Both RAM and the RSI are integrated of order one." The
following is the output from a regression using levels of RAM and the RSI






D-W - 0.03 R2 - 0.82.
The test for cointegration seeks to determine whether there is a unit root in
the residual, et , from equation (5). Under the null hypothesis that there is
a unit root in et , the test-statistic is -2.25, which is larger than the 5-
percent critical value of -3.17. Hence, one fails to reject the null
hypothesis that there is a unit root in the error term, suggesting that RAM
and RSI are not cointegrated. The small value of the Durbin-Watson statistic
also suggests that RAM and RSI are not cointegrated. The evidence, therefore,
suggests there is no long-run relationship between RAM and RSI. The
implication is that RAM gives weight to a deposit-flow effect that would
affect the forecast of changes in reserve requirement ratios over an infinite
horizon. Equation (5) suggests that the deposit-flow effect is integrated of
order one--that is the deposits against which reserves must be held have a
unit root--so that RAM and RSI are not cointegrated.
5. Relationships to Economic Activity
The previous section focused on a comparison of the two series. Thus
10far, the evidence presented formalizes what a casual empiricist would infer
from the plot of the two series; that the series exhibit very different
properties. The value gained by separating the reserve-requirement effect and
deposit-flow effect is clearer if the two series have differential content in
the context of explaining macroeconomic behavior. Two specific questions are
examined here. First, does the deposit-flow measure and/or RSI help to
explain movements in macroeconomic variables over and above the explanatory
power present in RAM?' Second, are the coefficients on deposit-flow measure
equal to the coefficients on RSI?
The first questions focuses on the value added by separating the
deposit-flow effect and the reserve-requirement effect. Here is where our use
of weekly data affects how one implements the empirical strategy. The changes
in required reserves during the week in which reserve requirements are changed
will generally not equal the difference between RAM measured during the month
in which reserve requirements changed and month before the change occurred.
The deposit-flow measure is calculated as the change in RAM between those
months in which no reserve requirement changes occurred. Still, the sum of
the change in RSI and the change in the deposit-flow variable do not equal the
change in RAM because of the difference between weekly changes in required
reserves used to construct RSI and monthly values of RAM. Hence, the change
in RAM is equal to the change in RSI plus the change in the deposit-flow
measure plus some "monthly noise
ll for periods in which reserve requirements
change.
The strategy taken here was to estimate a reduced-form model in which
the percentage change in RAM, the percentage-change in the deposit-flow
variable, and the percentage-change in RSI (each as a proportion of the
11adjusted monetary base) are included in the specification. RAM implicitly
restricts the coefficients on the deposit-flow effect and the reserve-
requirement effect to be equal. By including the deposit-flow measure and RSI
in the regression we can test whether this restriction is supported by the
data. The presence of the monthly noise means that this test is not
equivalent to testing whether the coefficient on RSl is equal to the
coefficient on the deposit-flow measure.
We estimate reduced-form models of the inflation rate (using the fixed-
weight deflator), the percentage change in real GNP, and the percentage
change in nominal GNP. The right-side variables in these regressions are
lagged values of the percentage change in high-powered money as proportion of
the monetary base along with RAM, RSI, and the deposit flow-variable. In the
inflation and output growth equations, we include lagged values of the
inflation rate and real GNP growth. In the nominal GNP growth equation, its
lagged value is included. As one notices, the regressions are individual
regressions from two separate VAR systems: one with the adjusted monetary
base decomposed into four components, the inflation rate and output growth and
the other with the same four components and nominal GNP growth. One lag of
each variable is included in the results reported below. Quarterly data are
obtained from Balke and Gordon (1986) on real GNP and the fixed-weight
deflator for the period 1929-83. We estimate the regressions over two
periods: 1929-83 and 1951-83.'0
A point on interpreting our results. The reduced-form setting used in
this analysis does little to shed light on the transmission mechanism
differentiating the reserve-requirement effect from the deposit-flow effect.
The key reason for separating the two effects in a reduced-form specification
12is that the deposit-flow effect signals changes affecting the demand for
deposits by households and the supply of deposits by banks. As such, the
deposit-flow effect measured in this reduced-form equation is an amalgam of
these different shocks. 11 However, the reserve-requirement effect is a tax on
the banking system, and hence is a particular type of shock. While these
tests do not provide direct evidence on the structural effects, they provide
evidence as to whether separating reserve-requirement effects help to predict
economic activity differently that the amalgam of shocks picked up by the
deposit-flow effect.
Table 1 reports the results from estimating the reduced-form equations
for the 1929-83 period and the 1951-83 period. The key result reported in
Table 1 is that the coefficient on the lagged value of RSI is significant at
the 5-percent level in the real GNP and nominal GNP equations for the 1929-83
sample and in the nominal GNP equation for the 1951-83 period. This finding
suggests that changes in RSI help to predict changes in output growth and
nominal spending growth differently than do the other components in RAM. As
such, this evidence supports our original claim that reserve-requirement
effects need to be separated out from RAM.
Another claim is that the reserve-requirement effect is different from
the deposit-flow effect. In Table 1, the evidence suggests that the
coefficient on RSI is different from the coefficient on either the deposit-
flow variable or the "monthly noise" measure. (The monthly noise could be
conceptually the same as deposit-flow, but more detailed data would be
necessary to verify this.) The next step is to explicitly relax the
assumption the reserve requirement effect and deposit-flow variable have
equal-sized coefficients. We exclude RAM from the regression based on the
13evidence presented in Table I, reporting the test statistics calculated under
the null that the coefficient on RSI is equal to the coefficient on the
deposit-flow variable. As Table 2 shows, the null hypothesis can be rejected
at the 5- and 6-percent levels in the nominal GNP and real GNP equations,
respectively for the 1929-83 sample. In contrast, one can reject the null
hypothesis at the 8-percent level in the 1951-83 sample in the inflation
equation, but one fails to reject the null in either the real or nominal GNP
equations. The evidence, therefore, provides some evidence in support of the
notion that the coefficients on RSI and the deposit-flow variable are equal.
Overall, the evidence supports our claim that reserve-requirement
effects have different effects so that the implicit restriction imposed by RAM
is not supported by the data. Hence, the evidence suggests that one should
separate the reserve-requirement ratio effects from the deposit-flow effects
that are commingled in RAM. Our goal is rather modest in that we seek
differences in marginal predictive power. More specific issues, and
differential effects, require further identifying restrictions.
6. Conclusion
We construct the reserve requirement step index to measure changes in
reserve requirement ratios for the period 1929-91. The main benefit of this
index is that it excludes the effects that changes in deposit quantities have
on the existing measures. Our index focuses on changes in reserve requirement
ratios, treating deposit-flow effects as containing separate, non-policy
information.
Most important, we demonstrate that the deposit shifts resulting in
changes in conventional reserve requirement measures are not trivial. Indeed,
14important historical examples of the significance of these deposit-flow
effects are provided. Deposit-flow effects are significant enough to yield an
absence of any apparent long-run association between our measure of changes in
reserve requirements and the conventional measures. The differences in the
measures also carryover to the macroeconomic setting. We test for the
differences in marginal predictive power between the reserve-requirement
effect and the deposit-flow effect. We provide evidence suggesting that the
coefficient on RSI-the reserve requirement effect--is different from zero,
suggesting that the reserve requirement effect is different from the
coefficient on RAM. This evidence is added reason for separating the policy
effect from those factors affecting deposit market equilibrium.
Our goal in this paper is rather modest. Its main contribution is
constructing a data series, in the reserve requirement change that is directly
under the influence of the policymaker is extracted from the existing measure.
Important issues still remain, such as identifying a theoretical structure
that explains how changes in reserve requirement ratios are different from





Tolley (1957, p.466) discusses a measure of changes in average changes
in reserve requirement ratios. As Tolley mentions, his construction of
an average reserve requirement ratio is "jointly determined by
government, banks, and the non-bank publiC. tl However I Tolley's concept
of an average reserve requirement ratio is quite different from
Brunner's notion. Tolley included currency in his definition of reserve
base. Consequently, currency has a reserve requirement ratio of one.
Brunner focused on liberated reserves through changes in reserves
required against deposits, not currency and deposits.
The criticism of the St. Louis reserve adjustment index measure also
applies to the Board's reserve adjustment index measure. The primary
difference in the two measures is that Board measure uses today's
reserve requirement ratio structure as the base period, whereas the St.
Louis version uses the average reserve requirement structure calculated
over the period 1976-80.
In addition, adding RAM to, say, total reserves or source base results
in a counterfactual series. For example, TRt - RRt + ERt - rtDt + ~.
Adding RAM yields an adjusted total reserves series which after
substituting equation (1) for RAM is expressed as rbDt + ERt . Hence,
the adjusted total reserve series is a counterfactual of what required
reserves would have been if the base-period reserve requirement





Frost (1977) and Neumann (1983) suggest the construction of an improved
RAM measure. Neumann suggests that Dt in equation (1) be replaced by a
vector of average deposit levels for the entire period. Consider equa1-
sized changes in reserve requirements taken at two different times.
Neumann's approach would indicate the same degree of easing by each
move. Frost suggests a measure derived from the nonlinear model of the
money supply process.
We gratefully acknowledge the help of Dennis Mehegen at the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis for providing us with weekly data over the
period January 1968 to June 1991.
Our step reserve index measure is still subject to deposit flow effects,
but only the deposit flows which occur between the weeks in which
reserve requirement ratios are changed. Note that in equation (2), the
RSI can be rewritten as rt_,Dt_, - rtDt . Changes in deposits from t-1 to
t will be picked up in RSI. To correct for this deficiency, one would
need the use of detailed deposit data that is not generally available.
We believe that this deposit-flow effect is small, especially relative
to deposit-flow effects present in the reserve adjustment indexes that
permit change in months in which no reserve requirement ratio changes
occur.
Haslag and Hein (1989) suggest that the Monetary Control Act of 1980
(MCA) effectively lowered reserve requirements for depository




reserve requirements on all other depository institutions, in addition,
to Fed member banks, raised reserve requirements. Our RSI measure
supports the inference that MCA effectively freed reserves.
The Phillips-Perron test is applied to RAM and the RSI in both level and
percent-change forms. Under the null hypothesis that there is a unit
root in RAM, the test statistics are 0.80 in level form and -25.67 in
percent-change form, whereas the test statistics are 1.88 in level form
and -46.38 in percent-change form for the RSI. The 5-percent critical
value is -3.17. Switching the dependent and independent variables in
equation (3) does not affect the results. Thus, the evidence suggests
that RAM and the RSI are nonstationary in levels but stationary in
percent change.
The issue is intertwined with differences between outside and inside
money. The deposits against which reserve must be held are liabilities
of banks, and thus reflect changes in demand for and supply of
intermediated deposits. Changes in reserve requirement ratios, other
things held constant, affect the demand for high-powered money.
The monetary variables are calculated relative to the monetary base.
For example, SB< - (SB< - SBe_1)![(MB< + MB<_1)!2), where SB denotes
source base and MB denotes the monetary base. Note that MB< - SB< +
RSle + DEPFLOWe + I(RAM< - RSI<) , where I is an indicator function that
equals 1 for periods in which there is a change in reserve requirements
and 0 otherwise.
1811
The 1951-83 period was selected because it encompasses the period
after World War II and after the Fed-Treasury accord.
Fama (1982) argues that banks' decision to supply is likely to be
related to changes in reserve requirements. By having both deposits and
reserve requirements in the regression, we are implictly examining the
effect of changes in reserve requirements on economic activity, holding
deposits constant. The incidence of reserve requirement tax on deposits
would be evident in the impulse response functions but not in this
predictive context.
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21Table 1
Regression Results for Inflation,
Output Growth, and Nominal GNP Growth Equations
Estimating Period: 1229-83 Estimated Coefficients
Equations
Variable Inflation Real GNP Nominal GNP
Inflation 0.743** 0.005 n.a.
(0.049) (0.122)
real GNP -0.001 0.274** n.a.
(0.027) (0.067)
RAM 0.092 -0.439* -0.385
(0.102) (0.256) (0.291)
SB 0.008 0.055 0.040
(0.034) (0.029) (0.097)
RSI -0.032 0.756** 0.728**
(0.101) (0.254) (0.292)
DEPFLOW -0.015 -0.044 -0.047
(0.012) (0.029) (0.033)




Inflation 0.618** -0.552** n.a.
(0.078) (0.201)
real GNP 0.028 -0.019 n.a.
(0.035) (0.090)
RAM 0.215** 0.183 0.286
(0.098) (0.252) (0.192)
SB 0.210** 0.470*' 0.520**
(0.072) (0.186) (0.126)
RSI 0.122 0.186 0.383**
(0.098) (0.254) (0.193)
DEPFLOW -0.057 0.090 0.083
(0.033) (0.084) (0.064)
nominal GNP n.a. n.a. 0.347**
(0.084)
Legend: ** denotes signficant at the five-percent level
* denotes signficant at the ten-percent level
23Table 2
Test Statistics on the
























, Reported is an F-statistics calculated with degrees of freedom (I, 212) for
the 1929-83 sample and (1, 127) for the 1951-83 sample, respectively.
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Historical Values of RAM and RSI, 1929:1 -1991:6
84 87 90DATA APPENDIX
RSI, Monthly. 1929-91
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
1929 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 ·3.987 -31l87 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 ·3.987 -3.987
1930 ·3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -31l87 ·3.987 ·31l87 ·3.987 ·3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987
1931 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 ·31l87 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 ·3.987 -31l87
1932 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 ·3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -31l87
1933 -3.987 ·3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -31l87 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -31l87
1934 -3.987 -3.987 -3.ll87 -3.987 -31l87 ·3.987 ·-31l87 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -31l87
1935 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -31l87 -3.987 -31l87 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 ·31l87
1938 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -3.987 -31l87 ·31l87 -5.634 -5.634 -5.634 -5.634
1937 -5.634 -5.634 -5.634 -8.106 ·8.106 -6.81 -6.81 -6.81 -8.81 ·6.81 -6.81 -6.81
1938 -6.81 -8.81 ·6.81 -6.81 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 ·6.12 -6.12
1939 -8.12 ·6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12
1940 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -5.12 -6.12
1941 -6.12 -6.12 ·8.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 -6.12 ·7.198 ·7.198
1942 ·7.198 -7.198 -7.198 -7.198 -7.198 ·7.198 ·7.198 ·6.832 -7.198 -6.499 -6.107 -6.107
1943 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -8.107 -8.107 -6.107 -6.107 ·6.107 -6.107
1944 ·6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107
1945 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -8.107 ·6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 ·8.107 -6.107 -6.107
1946 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107
1947 -8.107 -8.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -8.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107 -6.107
1948 -6.107 -6.107 -6.667 -6.667 -6.667 -6.667 -7.101 ·7.101 -7.101 -8.955 -8.955 -8.955
1949 -8.955 -8.955 ·8.955 -8.955 -8.955 -7.748 -7.748 -6.932 -5.683 -5.41 ·5.41 -5.41
1950 ·5.41 -5.41 -5.41 -5.41 -5.41 ·5.41 -5.41 -5.41 -5.41 -5.41 -5.41 -5.41
1951 -5.41 -7.066 -7.268 -7.268 ·7268 -7268 ·7268 ·7268 ·7.268 ·7.268 -7.268 -7.268
1952 -7268 -7268 -7.268 ·7.268 -7.268 -7268 -7.268 -7.268 -7268 -7268 ·7.268 ·7.268
1953 -7268 -7288 ·7268 -7268 -7268 -7268 -7.268 -6.408 -6.408 -6.408 -6.408 ·6.408
1954 ·6.408 ·6.408 -6.408 -6.408 -8.408 -6.408 -5.827 -5.154 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115
1955 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115 ·5.115 -5.115 ·5.115 ·5.115 ·5.115 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115
1956 -5.115 -5.115 ·5.115 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115 ·5.115
1957 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115 ·5.115 ·5.115 -5.115 -5.115 -5.115
1958 -5.115 -5.115 -4.338 -3.46 -2.926 -2.926 -2.926 -2.926 -2.926 -2.926 -2.926 ·21l28
1959 -21l26 -21l26 -21l26 -2.926 -21l26 ·21l26 ·2.928 ·2.926 ·2.928 -2.926 -2.926 -21l26
1960 -2.926 -2.926 ·21l26 -2.926 -2.926 -2.926 -21l26 -2.926 -2.926 -2.762 ·2.782 ·3.189
1961 -2.828 ·2.828 -2.828 -2.828 -2.828 -2.828 ·2.828 -2.628 -2.628 -2.828 -2.828 -2.828
1962 -2.828 -2.828 -2.828 -2.828 -2.828 -2.828 -2.828 -2.828 -2.628 ·2.628 -2.322 -1.872
1963 -1.872 -1.872 ·1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872
1964 ·1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 ·1.872 ·1.872 ·1.872 -1.872 -1.872
1965 -1.872 -1.872 ·1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 ·1.872
1966 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 -1.872 ·1.872 ·1.991 -11l91 -2.787 -2.787 -2.787
1967 -2.787 -2.787 -2.787 -2.115 -2.115 -2.115 -2.115 -2.115 -2.115 ·2.115 -2.115 -2.115
1968 -2.115 -2.714 -2.714 ·2.714 -2.714 -2.714 -2.714 -2.714 -2.714 -2.714 ·2.714 -2.714
1969 -2.714 ·2.714 -2.714 ·2.714 -3.657 -3.657 -3.657 -3.657 -3.657 -3.657 -3.657 -3.657
1970 -3.657 -3.657 -3.657 -3.657 -3.657 -3.657 -3.657 -3.657 -3.657 ·3.331 -3.331 -3.331
1971 -3.331 -3.331 ·3.331 -3.331 -3.331 -3.331 -3.331 -3.331 -3.331 -3.331 -3.331 ·3.331
1972 -3.331 -3.331 -3.331 -3.331 ·3.331 -3.331 -3.331 -3.331 -3.331 -3.331 -1.107 -1.107
1973 -1.107 -1.107 ·1.107 -1.107 -1.107 -1.107 -1.107 -1.522 -1.522 -1.522 -1.522 ·1.522
1974 -1.522 -1.522 -1.522 -1.522 -1.522 ·1.522 -1.522 ·1.522 ·1.522 ·1.522 -1.522 -1.522
1975 ·1296 -1.296 -0.5n -0.5n -<1.577 -0.5n -0.577 -<1.577 -0.5n -0.577 -0.274 -0274
1976 -0274 -0.193 -0.193 -0.193 -<1.193 -0.193 ·0.193 -0.193 -0.193 -0.193 -0.193 -0.193
19n -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 ·0.17 ·0.17 ·0.17 -0.17 -0.17
1978 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.249 -3.184 -3.184
1979 -3.184 -2241 ·2.241 -2.241 -2241 -2.241 ·2241 ·2241 -2.241 -3.963 -3.963 -3.963
1980 ·3.963 -31l63 -31l63 ·3.963 ·3.963 -3.963 -0.742 0.445 0.445 0.445 -11l55 -1.955
1981 ·1.955 -11l55 -1.955 -1.738 ·2.578 -2.578 -2.578 -2.578 -1.527 -1.527 ·1.527 ·0.326
1982 -0.326 -0.326 ·0.326 1.939 1.939 1.939 1.939 1.939 2.871 3.089 3.089 3.089
1983 3.498 3.498 3.498 4.328 4.328 4.85 4.85 4.85 6.269 6.681 6.681 6.681
1984 6.882 6.882 6.882 6.882 8.882 6.882 6.882 6.882 6.067 6.067 6.067 6.067
1985 7.655 7.655 7.655 7.655 7.655 7.655 7.655 7.655 6.38 6.38 6.38 8.38
1986 8.912 8.912 8.912 8.912 8.912 8.912 8.912 8.912 7217 7.217 7.217 7.217
1987 10.864 10.864 10.864 10.864 10.864 10.864 10.864 10.864 8.584 8.584 8.564 8.564
1988 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835 10.835
1989 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305 13.305
1990 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 15.521 20.922
1991 25.824 25.624 25.624 25.624 25.624 25.624RESEARCH PAPERS OF THE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
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